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International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations 
 
Abstract 
An emerging “clash of civilizations” should reveal itself in patterns of international 
terrorism. Huntington himself explicitly refers to terrorism in the conflict between 
specific civilizations, and particularly so in the clash between the Islamic civilization 
and the West. We confront his hypotheses with ones derived from our theory of the 
strategic logic of international terrorism. We predict more terrorism against nationals 
from countries whose government supports the government of the terrorists’ home 
country. Similar to Huntington, we also predict excessive terrorism on Western targets, 
but because of the high strategic value of attacking Westerners, not because of inter-
civilizational conflict per se. Contrary to Huntington, our theory does not suggest that 
groups from the Islamic civilization commit more terrorist acts against nationals from 
other civilizations in general. Nor do we expect a general increase in inter-civilizational 
terrorism after the end of the Cold War. Our empirical analysis – based on estimations 
in a directed dyadic country sample from 1969 to 2005 – finds broad support for our 
theory: foreign political support generates more terrorism against nationals of the 
supporting foreign country. Our results also suggest that the Rest-West and the Islam-
West dyads indeed encounter significantly more terrorism, which is in line with 
Huntington, but not necessarily inconsistent with our own theory either. However, in 
contradiction to Huntington we do not find that there is generally more terrorism from 
the Islamic against other civilizations. Also, we find no evidence for a general structural 
break in the pattern of international terrorism after the end of the Cold War. 
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This struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a 
struggle for civilization. 
George W. Bush 2006 
Al Qaeda could not be happier than in a real clash among 
civilizations. 
Giandomenico Picco 2005: 14 
The current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of 
civilizations.  
Joseph Nye 2004: 17 
It is not … in the interest of the West to view this as a clash of 
Western and Muslim civilizations. 
Ahmed S. Hashim 2001: 29 
This is no less than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational 
but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-
Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion 
of both.  
Bernard Lewis 1990: 60. 
 
1.  Introduction  
After the end of the Cold War, conflicts between civilizations struggling for influence 
on a new world order pose the greatest danger for international stability and peace. This, 
at least, is the central tenet of Samuel Huntington’s famous and best-selling book The 
Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1996) and his earlier Foreign Affairs article 
(Huntington 1993a).  
Recently, events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the bombings in Bali, 
Madrid and London were interpreted by many as striking evidence for Huntington’s 
paradigm. Yet, the wide attention Huntington’s works has attracted in public discussion 
of international terrorism (Ahmed and Forst 2005; United Nations 2006) contrasts with 
its reception in the empirical academic debate in at least two respects. First, scholarly 
work that has tested Huntington’s theoretical predictions has focused exclusively on 
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patterns of militarized inter-state dispute, inter-state and civil wars. To our knowledge, 
no test exists of hypotheses derived from Huntington’s work on terrorism. And second, 
tests of Huntington’s arguments have typically failed to find evidence for a clash of 
civilizations.1
However, empirical tests of Huntington are hampered by the fact that the term 
“clash” is nowhere clearly defined in his work and that, depending on the pair of 
civilizations looked at, it means many different things to Huntington. Given the 
ambiguity of the term, tests that fail to find that inter-civilizational dyads in general are 
more likely to experience one particular type of conflict do not establish fully 
convincing evidence against Huntington. More importantly, existing scholarship has 
neglected that, for some civilizational dyads for which Huntington predicts a high level 
of conflict, he himself mentions terrorism, as in the clash of “Rest versus West”, or even 
explicitly emphasizes the use of terrorism, as in the clash of “Islam versus Rest” and 
“Islam versus West”. Our test of Huntington’s predictions, then, provides additional 
insights as to the relevance of his paradigm. 
Rather than merely testing predictions derived from Huntington’s work, however, 
we also compare his paradigm to a strategic theory of international terrorism. Our the-
ory argues that the leaders of terror groups are predominantly rational and act 
strategically to reach their goal of gaining political influence on the political system of 
their home country. We argue that terror group leaders from other civilizations have a 
general interest in attacking Western targets due to their high strategic value, and a 
specific interest in attacking targets from those foreign countries whose government 
lends support to the government of the terrorists’ home country. We find broad support 
for our strategic theory as well as some limited support for Huntington’s predictions in a 
directed country dyad sample over the period 1969 to 2005. 
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2. Huntington and the Clash of Civilizations Hypothesis 
2.1 A new Era in World Politics? 
Huntington’s clash of civilizations hypothesis has many facets (Huntington 1993a, 
1996). If there is, however, one central hypothesis in his work it is this: The dominant 
source of conflict will shift from the clash of ideologies during the Cold War period (li-
beral democracy vs. communism) to the clash between nations and groups of different 
civilizations after the end of the Cold War: “…conflicts between groups in different 
civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts 
between groups in the same civilization” (Huntington 1993a: 48). 
He defines civilizations as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest 
level of cultural identity people have”, being “differentiated from each other by history, 
language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion” (ibid.: 25). Huntington 
distinguishes seven, or possibly eight civilizations – Western, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, 
Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and, possibly, African. He posits that 
civilizational differences “are the product of centuries” and “far more fundamental than 
differences among political ideologies and political regimes” and are therefore “less 
mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic 
ones” (Huntington 1993a: 25 and 27). Moreover, such differences are not merely an 
abstract construction: “[that] civilizations are meaningful entities accords with the way 
in which people see and experience reality” (Huntington 1993b: 194). 
He then goes on to argue that the Cold War had artificially plastered over and 
dampened inter-civilizational conflicts. The end of the Cold War allowed these conflicts 
to emerge and gain strength. They also draw strength from economic modernization, 
which tends to weaken the nation-state as a source of identity. This, in turn, leads to a 
revival of religion as an alternative source of identity. As Huntington (ibid.: 191f.) puts 
it: “In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates 
and mobilizes people.” Finally, the declining power of the Western civilization and the 
rising power of other civilizations allow the latter to challenge Western hegemony.  
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Throughout his work on inter-civilizational conflicts, Huntington remains reluctant 
to formulate testable predictions arising from his paradigm. This is ironic given he also 
states that “a crucial test of a paradigm’s validity and usefulness is the extent to which 
the predictions derived from it turn out to be more accurate than those from alternative 
paradigms” (Huntington 1996: 37). Consequently, critics have charged his work with 
being ambiguous, inconsistent and sometimes self-contradictory (Russett, Oneal and 
Cox 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006). Due to space 
constraints, we cannot engage with these arguments in great detail. Instead, we 
concentrate on two aspects that are central to the focus of this paper: the conflict 
intensity of pairs of civilizations and the meaning of the term “clash”. 
2.2  Inter-civilizational Pairs and their Conflict Intensity 
On top of his hypothesis of a general clash of civilizations, Huntington regards certain 
civilizations and certain pairs of civilizations as more prone to conflict than others. Yet, 
Huntington’s argumentation with respect to the conflict intensity of inter-civilizational 
dyads is not fully specified. His book provides a network graphic, which distinguishes 
three degrees of conflict intensity (Huntington 1996: 245). Given that Huntington has 
identified eight different civilizations, this results in 28 civilization dyads. However, he 
provides information on the expected conflict intensity for only 17 out of these 28 
dyads. Table 1 reproduces Huntington’s predictions: 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
We indicate the 11 civilization dyads for which Huntington does not provide an answer 
by a question mark – leaving open whether he means that these dyads are not conflictual 
(for reasons he does not discuss) and should therefore be coded 0 or whether his 
paradigm does not allow him to derive a prediction with respect to this dyad. 
Huntington provides full information on conflict intensity only for dyads that include 
the West. This seems to result from his judgment that – as non-Western civilizations 
become increasingly self-assertive and Western countries attempt to maintain their 
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economic, political and military dominance – there will be increasing conflict between 
“the West versus the Rest” (Huntington 1993a: 39). But Islam also stands out. He 
provides information for five out of seven relations to other civilizations, four of which 
are highly conflictual. 
2.3  What does Clash mean? 
Huntington’s theoretical imprecision is not limited to the matrix of inter-civilizational 
conflicts. He also remains unclear about his second most important term: clash. While 
he states that clashes between civilizations will become the greatest threat to world 
peace and that “the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” 
(Huntington 1993a: 22), the term is nowhere explicitly defined or thoroughly explained. 
Rather, Huntington subsumes very different things under the same umbrella, depending 
on specific civilization dyads looked at. For example, the clash between the West and 
Japan is mainly described in economic terms, the conflict between the Western and the 
Sinic civilization mainly in military terms.  
For some civilizational combinations, Huntington mentions, almost in passing, the 
use of terrorism as one form of conflict. In the clash between the Rest against the West, 
he identifies terrorism (together with nuclear arms) as one of the two weapons of the 
“non-Western weak” (Huntington 1996: 188). He refers much more explicitly to 
terrorism in his analysis of the Islamic civilization. For the clash between Islam and 
other civilizations, Huntington (2002: 3) states that “while groups from all religions 
have engaged in various forms of violence and terrorism, the figures make it clear that 
in the past decade Muslims have been involved in far more of these activities than 
people of other religions”. To this he adds a cross-reference to his (in)famous phrase of 
“the bloody borders of Islam” from Huntington (1993a).2 He particularly stresses the 
use of terrorism in relation to the asymmetric clash between Islam and the West. He 
(1996: 216) argues that “following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, an inter-civilizational 
quasi war developed between Islam and the West. (…) [I]t is a quasi war because, apart 
from the Gulf War of 1990-91, it has been fought with limited means: terrorism on one 
side and air power, covert action, and economic sanctions on the other.” 
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Huntington does not provide a systematic explanation of why terrorism is a favorite 
weapon employed in these clashes. The reason given for the use of terrorism by other 
civilizations against the West does not go beyond the observation that “terrorism 
historically is the weapon of the weak” (Huntington 1996: 187). His explanation of the 
extraordinary conflict intensity of Islam is not based on profound theoretical reasons 
either. He (1996: 263ff) perceives Islam as a “religion of the sword” with an absolutist 
ideology that makes co-habitation with other religions extremely difficult. However, 
many religions, not just Islam, can be and have historically been misused for the 
purpose of justifying terrorist violence (Rapoport 1984). Huntington also argues that 
geopolitically the Islamic civilization has no clear borders but overlaps with most other 
civilizations and is not dominated by a core state, causing conflict with both neighbors 
and within the Islamic world. However, this begs the question of why there is not 
excessive terrorism from other civilizations on victims of Islamic countries. Moreover, 
according to Huntington (1996: 135), the Latin American and African civilizations 
similarly miss a core state. Finally, and in Huntington’s view most importantly, the 
large number of unemployed males between the age of 15 and 30 is a natural source of 
violence both within the Islamic civilization and between it and other civilizations. Yet, 
many developing countries from other civilizations experience similar problems. 
According to Huntington, one should expect a particularly strong clash between 
Islam and the West given a fourteen centuries old legacy of conflict. This conflict 
ultimately stems from similarities in the aspirations of the two civilizations, e.g. as 
universalistic and missionary (Huntington 1996: 211), with simultaneous fundamental 
differences in culture and religion. “The underlying problem for the West”, writes 
Huntington (1996: 217), “is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civiliza-
tion whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with 
the inferiority of their power.” The Cold War period plastered over this conflict to some 
extent, but “the collapse of communism removed a common enemy of the West and 
Islam and left each the perceived major threat to the other.” (Huntington 1996: 211). 
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3. The Strategic Logic of International Terrorism 
In this section, we provide a competing account of international terrorism to 
Huntington. We follow Bueno de Mesquita’s (2006: 637) suggestion of a “natural 
progression from macro-level accounts (…) to the specification of their micro-
foundations”. On the micro-level our theory makes a crucial distinction between the 
leaders of terror groups and their followers.3 We assume that terror leaders and 
followers come from the same population of ideologues and believers.4 What 
differentiates the two is their relative position within terror groups. On the macrolevel, 
our theory specified the conditions under which terror leaders of one country have a 
strategic interest in attacking targets from foreign nations, even though their ultimate 
goal is to gain influence on domestic political matters (see the next section). Our theory 
builds on the rational approach to identifying and explaining the causes of international 
terrorism in conflict over political influence (Crenshaw 1981, 1998, 2001; Pape 2003, 
2005; Neumann and Smith 2005, Kydd and Walter 2006). 
3.1. Terror Group Leaders 
The leaders of terror groups are distinguished by having a crucial, decisive position in 
the terror organization. They are the leaders and therefore behave predominantly 
strategically. From their perspective, terrorism is a rational strategy in a political 
struggle to achieve an end, not an end in itself. In other words, terror leaders 
instrumentalize terror because they want to make the powerful respond – preferably in a 
way that changes the situation better to suit the interests of the terrorists. Terrorism is 
not simply violence, often against civilians, in order to create fear. Rather, terrorism 
aims at creating fear, because the induced fear will in turn lead somebody else to 
respond in a way that makes it more likely that the terrorists will achieve their goals 
(Fromkin 1975: 693). 
What are the goals of terror leaders? The exact answer depends on the type of terror 
organization. However, practically all terror leaders want to achieve some fundamental 
change in policies, or even a change in the political regime of, their home country or the 
wider region.5 Terror group leaders thus strive to gain political influence and, 
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ultimately, control. This generic end-goal unites terror groups despite extreme 
differences in their ideologies. 
Following Rapoport (2003) and Shugart (2006), we can distinguish three over-
lapping “waves of modern terrorism”:6 After the anti-colonial/ethno-nationalist and 
radical left waves, religious terrorism is now dominating, with Islam “at the heart of the 
wave” (Rapoport 2003: 61; similarly Pedahzur, Eubank and Weinberg 2002: 146). The 
anti-colonial and ethno-nationalist groups wanted national independence from colonial 
occupiers or secession for their ethnic group, and they were often successful. The 
radical left groups wanted to overthrow capitalism, which failed spectacularly. The 
Islamic terror groups want to force governments in Islamic countries to adopt policies in 
line with their own radical interpretation of Islam. Some are more ambitious still and 
want to topple any government that prevents, often by violent means, the Islamists from 
increasing their influence and grip on political power (Sedqwick 2004). 
If fundamental political change is the ultimate goal of terror leaders, why do they 
resort to terror rather than other forms of political action and why does terror represent a 
suitable instrument for achieving their goals? Terror leaders typically face one or more 
of three constraints. The first is the exclusion from the political process; the second is 
insufficient support among the wider population; while the third is the asymmetry in 
strength or power between the government and the terror group (Crenshaw 1981; 
Hoffman 2002). 
Terrorism is also instrumental in achieving intermediate goals in the long struggle 
for the ultimate goal of violent political change. First, terror raises the costs of political 
stability. Terror attacks create a feeling of insecurity, which provokes the targeted 
government to invest more heavily in security policies. Second, terror attacks stimulate 
political responses that worsen the situation of the terror group’s actual and potential 
supporters (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004). As we will see in the next section, this can 
help in the recruitment of terrorists. And third, terror attacks generate media attention, 
which allows the terror leaders to gain voice and spread their ideology. Again, this will 
facilitate the recruitment of followers. 
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Thus, besides hitting the targeted enemy, terrorism serves terror leaders in their 
struggle to gather support and recruit followers. This is essential for the functioning and 
the success of the terror group (Siqueira and Sandler 2006). Terrorists not only need 
shelter, raise the financial means to buy weaponry and to run training camps, they also 
need individuals willing to serve as terrorists. The leaders of terror groups (while often 
toying with weapons in front of TV cameras) rarely fight their terror campaigns 
themselves. Rather, they usually act exclusively as terror group leaders. In other words, 
while they have ultimate strategic goals, perhaps the most important intermediate aim of 
terror attacks is to increase their support and recruit followers, to whom we turn now. 
3.2.  Followers 
Terror followers are individuals who are attracted to the leaders’ ideology, but are not in 
a decisive or crucial position within the terror organization. Rather, they are the soldiers 
of the leaders and follow specified or unspecified commands, which may include the 
command of self-sacrifice in a suicide terror mission (see Pape 2003). In contrast to the 
group leaders, terror followers need not behave predominantly strategically or 
rationally. They may be driven by several, complex and varied motivations that may 
also depend on contextual and sometimes very personal circumstances (Post 1998; 
Victoroff 2005). We suggest, however, that three factors are essential in the successful 
recruitment of terrorists: ideological appeal, peer acknowledgement and political 
grievances. 
If individuals do not share the ideology of the terror leaders, they will not support 
the terror group to reach its strategic goals, because under such circumstances their 
utility will decline if the group reaches its ultimate goal. The more appealing the terror 
leaders’ ideology and their strategic goals to parts of the population, the easier is re-
cruitment. The radical left terror groups of the past failed not least because their 
ideology and goals did not appeal to the wider population and they therefore remained 
splinter groups.  
Second, joining a terror group becomes more likely if potential followers receive 
some peer acknowledgement for doing so. While terrorists almost by definition are 
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outcasts, the greater the acknowledgement they receive among the small group of direct 
supporters and among the wider population, the more they can feel justified in 
perpetrating acts that are normally regarded as heinous (Moghadam 2003; Speckhard 
and Ahkmedova 2006). Targeting attacks against innocent civilians no matter what their 
personal circumstances and political attitudes is difficult to justify. Peer ac-
knowledgement means that terrorists are not exclusively regarded as ruthless and ultra-
violent criminals, but, by some at least, as heroic fighters for the righteous cause. The 
more peer acknowledgement terrorists receive, the more they will be able to overcome 
the scruples that might otherwise prevent them from joining terror groups. For these 
reasons, terror leaders invest in communication with their own peers, with the aim of 
raising their acknowledgement.7 Media attention is of utmost importance as it helps the 
terror leaders to spread their propaganda to potential new recruits (Rohner and Frey 
2007). 
Finally, political grievances again raise the ideological appeal of terror groups. 
Such grievances spur hatred and anger and the wish to revenge oneself on those who are 
perceived as being the cause of grievance (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Richardson 
2006). According to Bueno de Mesquita (2005: 518) the ideological benefits that 
individuals derive from joining terror groups increase with reprisals from a regime 
“blamed for the loss of freedom, dignity and rights”. Interviews with terrorists reveal 
how grievances inflicted by counter-terrorist measures provide a powerful incentive to 
join terror groups (Stern 2003; Khosrokhavar 2005). 
4.  Differences between Huntington’s Paradigm and our Strategic Theory 
In this section, we identify where Huntington’s paradigm and our theory make different 
predictions on patterns of inter-civilizational terrorism, which can be tested against each 
other. Based on Huntington, one would expect excessive terrorism from non-Western 
civilizations against Western targets, excessive terrorism emanating from the Islamic 
civilization and directed against non-Islamic civilizations, as well as excessive Islamic 
terrorism against Western targets. 
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As concerns our own theory, we focus on why terrorists can be drawn toward 
attacking foreign targets. Our theory posits that terror leaders aim for political influence 
in their country or wider region. Accordingly, one would expect that the victims of ter-
rorism come mainly from the same country as the terrorists. This is indeed the case. 
While there is no dataset that comprehensively covers both international and purely 
domestic terrorism, estimates are that around 90 per cent of terrorism is in fact 
domestic, in the sense that the terrorists and their victims share the same nationality and 
no other aspect of the terror attack is international (Enders 2007: 832). 
If terror leaders are focused on domestic political change, the question is why do 
they attack foreign targets as well and why do they attack victims from certain foreign 
countries much more than from others? Based on our strategic theory, we would expect, 
first, more terrorism directed against Western targets. With terror leaders dependent on 
media and public attention, attacking Western targets provides clear strategic benefits 
given that most of the media corporations have headquarters and their major customer 
base in Western countries. Attacking Western targets is certainly making it into the 
global news. It is also very difficult for the government of the terrorists’ home country 
to ignore such attacks and, since terrorists want the government to respond to their 
terror, attacking Westerners has strategic value. 
Second, our theory also predicts more terrorism directed against targets from 
other countries if the foreign government supports and stabilizes the government of the 
terrorists’ home country. Such support can take the form of, among other things, 
military alliances, military intervention in civil wars, arms transfers and economic aid. 
Indeed, some governments only survive with foreign support. In such cases, it can be 
the strength of the foreign power rather than the strength of the domestic government 
that prevents terror leaders from reaching their aims. The more the home government 
depends on foreign support, the more important the foreign power becomes as an 
obstacle to the terror leaders. If the terrorist attacks on foreign powers force the foreign 
power to reduce its support for the government the terrorists seek to overthrow, then the 
terror leaders get closer to their strategic goal. 
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This prediction of our theory holds true independently of the civilizational 
belonging of either the terrorists or their victims. For example, our theory predicts that 
Russian support to Central Asian Republics who face a domestic conflict with Islamist 
terrorists will increase terror against Russian targets. Similarly, American support to 
Colombia will increase anti-American terrorism by Colombian terrorists. According to 
Huntington (1996: 245) the relationship between the Latin and the Western civilization 
should be relatively peaceful, yet patterns of international terrorism show very 
substantial terrorist activity directed from Latin American terror groups against Western 
targets (around 14 per cent of all international and around 26 per cent of all inter-
civilizational terrorist incidents during the period 1969 to 2005 falls into this category). 
Our strategic theory predicts such patterns given the very large extent of Western and 
particularly US support to Latin American governments in conflict with domestic terror 
groups, whereas Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations paradigm cannot adequately 
account for these patterns. The same goes for the relationship between the West on the 
one hand and the Hindu and Sinic civilizations on the other hand, which according to 
Huntington (1996: 245) are conflictual and very conflictual, respectively. Yet, the level 
of anti-Western terrorism originating from these civilizations is minuscule (around 0.4 
and 1 per cent of all international terrorist incidents, respectively). Our strategic theory 
would predict such low terrorist activity given the relatively low extent of which 
governments of Hindu and Sinic states depend on Western foreign support. 
Our strategic theory is, however, not necessarily inconsistent with all of 
Huntington’s predictions. For example, it is not inconsistent with his prediction of 
excessive terrorist activity from non-Western terrorists against Western targets or by 
Islamic terrorists on Western targets, even though it provides very different reasons for 
such activity. For Huntington, such terrorism is rooted in a deep and long-running 
civilizational conflict. For us, terrorists do not attack foreigners simply because they are 
foreign or from a different civilization. Terror leaders are not drawn to violence for 
violence sake, even if directed against other civilizations. Inter-civilizational terrorism is 
thus not a priori distinguishable from international terrorism within one civilization. 
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Instead, anti-Western terrorism is the consequence of the high strategic value of 
attacking Westerners. Islamic terror leaders may face additional incentives to attack 
Western targets because of Western interference in countries of the Islamic civilization, 
whose support is often crucial in preventing Islamic terror groups’ bid for political 
influence.8 Western aid, arms, military assistance, military personnel as well as 
economic and political support play a pivotal role in stabilizing the regimes in many 
Muslim countries like Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and, nowadays, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, thus preventing Islamic terror leaders from reaching their goals. Terrorism targeted 
against the West as well as anyone co-operating with the West is supposed to provoke a 
military Western response that fosters anti-Western sentiments amongst the broader 
Muslim population. With anti-Western sentiments evolving on a large scale, radical 
Islamists hope that the West will come under pressure and will eventually withdraw its 
support, which would fulfill the strategic objective of the Islamic terror group leaders. 
Huntington’s paradigm also posits the existence of an important dynamic in inter-
civilizational clashes. He predicts that the end of the Cold War triggers off conflicts 
between different civilizations. Huntington sees the post-Cold War world as one in 
which different religions and cultures shape people’s values and interests, leading to 
dominant conflicts of a new type: the clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996: 21). If he 
is right, then one would expect a structural break around the end of the Cold War, with 
increases in inter-civilizational terrorism against Western targets, inter-civilizational 
terrorism perpetrated by Islamic groups and, particularly, Islamic terrorism against the 
West. 
The dynamics derived from our theory also differ from Huntington. In our theory, 
terrorist activity against victims of a specific nationality should go up if the strategic 
incentives for targeting these nationalities increase. This would be the case whenever 
the foreign support becomes more pivotal for the home country of the terror leaders. 
With respect to Islamic terrorism against Western targets, our theory suggests that 
dynamic changes in such terrorism do not depend on the prevalence of the Cold War as 
such, but on the strategic benefits Islamic terror leaders derive from targeting the West. 
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These benefits go up when the West increases its extent of interference in the Islamic 
civilization. International events of the first half of this decade should have made the 
West and the US in particular the single most important enemy of Islamic terror leaders. 
In particular, the Western invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 and the 
stabilization of embattled regimes in the Muslim world effectively serve as an obstacle 
to Islamic terror leaders, preventing them from reaching their goals. 
Furthermore, because political grievances help terror leaders in recruiting new 
followers, the continuing presence of Western troops on the soil of Muslim countries 
and the seeming ease with which the coalition troops overthrew the Taliban regime and 
the government of Saddam Hussein are likely to have added to the feelings of power-
lessness and humiliation among Muslim populations all around the world (Lewis 1990; 
Taarnby 2002; Fuller 2002; Richardson 2007; Riedel 2007). The US-led “war on terror” 
may or may not be successful in fighting the terror leaders; the odds are, however, that 
it renders recruiting Islamic terror followers easier still.9
5. Research Design  
In the remainder of this article we will test the predictions of Huntington’s paradigm as 
well as of our strategic theory of international terrorism. Before we do so, however, we 
discuss the research design in some detail. 
5.1. Variables 
Our measures of terrorism are based on the “International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events” (Iterate) dataset (Mickolus et al. 2003). It includes as acts of terror 
“the use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political 
purposes by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established 
governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and 
behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate victims” (ibid.: 2). Terrorist 
violence includes incidents as diverse as, among others, assassinations, bombings and 
armed attacks, arson and fire, kidnapping, and skyjacking, unless they are acts of 
ordinary crime or the violence is for purposes other than political, e.g., for drug 
trafficking. Violence committed during international and civil wars are not coded as 
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terrorism. Consequently, guerrilla attacks by rebel groups are not counted either, unless 
they are targeted against civilians or the dependents of military personnel (Mickolus, 
Sandler and Murdock 1989: xii). Thus, Iterate excludes terror attacks against soldiers of 
the coalition forces in Iraq, but includes kidnappings of foreign civil workers (Enders 
and Sandler 2006: 372). 
Importantly, Iterate excludes all terrorism that is purely domestic. To qualify as 
international, a terrorist act must “through the nationality or foreign ties of its 
perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the 
mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries” (Mickolus 
et al. 2003: 2). A terrorist act by groups fighting for independence (such as by the IRA) 
is counted as international if it takes place on the ruling country’s own soil, but if it is 
executed on the territory under dispute, then it is generally regarded as domestic. The 
exclusion of purely domestic terrorism is not a problem for our analysis. Neither 
Huntington’s clash of civilization’s paradigm nor our own strategic theory of 
international terrorism make predictions about the extent of domestic terrorism. 
The dataset compiles a wealth of information on each terrorist incident. Most 
importantly for our purposes, it codes, where relevant, the three primary nationalities of 
terrorists and victims, as well as the number of people killed. Yet, Iterate is not without 
problems. It does not list the exact number of fatalities belonging to each nationality. It 
is also dependent on mainly Western news reports and can therefore fail to capture 
incidents that did not make it into the news (Sandler and Enders 2004: 6). This could 
bias the results toward finding Westerners as the main victims of international terrorism 
and could thus bias our analysis toward finding evidence for excessive anti-Western 
inter-civilizational terrorism. Unfortunately, there is nothing one can do to correct this 
potential bias since there is no way of knowing how much terrorism against non-
Westerners fails to make it into Western news media and therefore into Iterate. Despite 
these and other shortcomings, Iterate represents by far the most detailed and complete 
existing dataset on international terrorism. 
17 
We code from the dataset two dependent variables: the annual sum of terrorist 
incidents and the annual sum of the number of people killed, which serves as a measure 
of intensity. The nationality information allows us to create directed country dyadic de-
pendent variables. Thus, terrorism perpetrated by nationals of country x against 
nationals of country y are counted toward the x→y dyad, whether it takes place on the 
territory of country x, country y or some third country z. Using nationality information 
means that we lose terrorist acts for which Iterate does not provide information on the 
primary nationality of terrorists or victims, but these are few in number. More 
importantly, to be on the conservative side, we do not include the terrorism committed 
by “Indeterminate Arabs, Palestine” in the multivariate estimations. Our results are, 
however, robust to allocating each of these terror attacks to a randomly drawn Arab 
country. 
An additional problem is that for the variable that measures the number of people 
killed, in a small number of cases (less than two per cent), Iterate indicates that people 
were killed, but states the number of people killed as unknown. Unfortunately, the 9/11 
terror attacks suffer from a combination of the two problems: 245 victims are stated 
(those on the planes), but for those killed on the ground, Iterate does not state a number, 
probably because the 2992 people killed in total (including the terrorists), as listed in the 
official 9/11 report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 
2004: 552), is not an exact figure. Less clear is why Iterate attributes the attacks to the 
group of “Indeterminate Arabs”, when 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi Arabian. We 
discuss below what effect the inclusion of the full death toll of 9/11 and its allocation to 
Saudi Arabia as the origin country would have on the analysis of Islam versus West 
terrorism. 
To avoid multiple counting, only the first nationality of the terrorists and the 
victims determines the origin and the target country of a terrorist act. This has the 
disadvantage that information on the second and third primary nationality of terrorists 
and victims is lost, but the vast majority of terrorist acts only involve one nationality of 
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both terrorists and victims.10 Our results are robust to attributing terrorist acts to all the 
first three main nationalities of terrorists and victims simultaneously. 
Using nationality to determine the civilizational belonging of terrorists and victims 
can be misleading. For example, if British-born Muslims kill primarily British citizens 
(as happened in the London attacks of July 2005), this would erroneously be coded as 
an intra-British and therefore intra-Western act of terrorism, whereas it is really an 
attack of Islamic terrorists on the West. Since this would bias the results against finding 
evidence for both Huntington’s and our hypotheses, we are not too concerned about 
such measurement error. 
Our central explanatory variables are variables of foreign support for domestic 
governments, in line with our strategic theory, and inter-civilizational dummy variables 
to account for Huntington’s predictions. A comprehensive test of our theory is 
hampered by the limited availability of data for a global sample on support rendered by 
the government of one country to that of another country. For example, we know of no 
comprehensive dataset of military aid by donors other than the United States. We 
include instead a measure of general economic aid, with data taken from OECD (2007). 
In addition, we have data on arms transfers from the major weapons exporters, both 
Western and non-Western, from SIPRI (2007), data on foreign intervention in domestic 
civil wars from Gleditsch et al. (2002) as well as data on military alliances between 
countries from Leeds (2005) and Sprecher and Krause (2006).11 Foreign aid is 
measured relative to gross domestic product of the receiving country (World Bank 
2006), whereas arms transfers are set in relation to domestic military expenditures 
(Correlates of War 2007 and World Bank 2006). In both cases, the idea is to measure 
foreign support relative to domestic capacity. For foreign intervention in civil wars, no 
data exist on the extent of foreign intervention. Instead, the variable accounts for the 3-
scale ordinal intensity of the armed conflict itself (below 25 annual battle deaths; above 
25, but below 1000; above 1000). Military alliance is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether two countries had entered into a formal alliance in the form of a defense pact 
with each other. There is the possibility that more support is rendered to countries from 
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which more terrorism against nationals of the supporting country’s government (reverse 
causality). We mitigate this potential problem by lagging the foreign support variables 
by one year.12
In order to test Huntington’s predictions we use three dummy variables for specific 
inter-civilizational pairs: rest v west for dyads in which the origin country is non-
Western whereas the target country is Western, islam v rest for dyads in which the 
origin country belongs to the Islamic civilization whereas the target country does not 
and islam v west for dyads in which the origin country belongs to the Islamic and the 
target country to the Western civilization. Huntington is neither perfectly clear nor 
consistent on which country belongs to which civilization. We follow here Russett, 
Oneal and Cox’s (2000) classification, but we stress that our results are robust to relying 
on Henderson and Tucker’s (2001) interpretation of Huntington instead. We exclude 
terror attacks involving Israeli terrorists or Israeli victims from all estimations. This is 
because we do not want to artificially inflate our estimates of Islamic terrorism against 
the West by including this very peculiar conflict. Results are robust to including Israel 
in the estimations, either as a Western state as in Russet, Oneal and Cox (2000) or into 
the residual category of “other” states as in Henderson and Tucker (2001). 
The inclusion of control variables is of great importance, because economic, 
political and geographical factors that are correlated with our foreign political support or 
with the civilizational dummy variables could determine international terrorism. Failure 
to include them would potentially lead to biased results. For example, some economists 
suggest that international terrorism is directed at wealthier Western countries (Abadie 
2006: 50). Autocracies supposedly produce more terrorism (Krueger and Laitin 2003: 4; 
Li 2005), whereas democracies are extremely vulnerable as terrorist targets (Pape 2003; 
Enders and Sandler 2006). Size also matters: More populous countries will, ceteris 
paribus, generate more terrorism and suffer more from terrorism. Contiguous and 
geographically close countries should experience more terrorism. We control for all 
these factors – see the appendix for variable definitions and data sources. Our results are 
robust to the inclusion of additional control variables such as bilateral trade, as well as 
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the presence or intensity of armed conflict between countries or within the origin or tar-
get country. We can also remove intra-civilizational dyads from the sample or control 
for intra-civilizational terrorism via a dummy variable and the results still hold. 
5.2. Estimation Methods 
We are only interested in international terrorism, not in domestic terrorism, since neither 
Huntington nor our strategic theory make predictions about domestic terrorism. In our 
dataset, there are many incidents where the main nationality of the terrorists and the 
victims are the same. These cases do not constitute purely domestic terrorism since 
some other aspect of the incident or its resolution might transcend national boundaries. 
Otherwise they would not be included in Iterate. However, these are cases in which the 
distinction between international and domestic terrorism is often blurred. In other 
words, the Iterate data are noisy and there is some measurement error in what counts as 
international and domestic terrorism. One can employ three strategies for dealing with 
such error. First, the “do nothing” option simply ignores the error. Second, one can try 
to control for the measurement error. This is the strategy we have chosen in the reported 
estimates by including a dummy variable for identical dyads (i.e., where the main 
nationality of the terrorists and the victims are the same). In comparison to the first 
strategy, the efficiency of the estimates is likely to increase and any potential bias is 
likely to decline, but it does not necessarily disappear. Third, one can remove identical 
dyads from the analysis. This option may reduce the efficiency of the estimate, but 
possibly also the bias. While we report only the results from the second strategy, we 
have conducted all three types of analyses and found no substantial differences in the 
parameters of interest. Our results are therefore robust and this apparent source of bias 
does not seem to matter much. 
Our dependent variables are count variables, which is why we use a negative 
binomial regression model with standard errors adjusted for clustering on civilizational 
dyads. Terrorism data are over-dispersed, so that the poisson model not only suffers 
from heteroskedasticity but also (and more importantly) from deflated standard errors 
(see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, ch. 20). The negative binomial model we use here 
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accounts for over-dispersion by augmenting the Poisson distribution by a Gamma 
distribution. Unless the distribution is grossly mis-specified, the negative binomial 
model gives more reliable estimates. Our sample covers the period 1969 to 2005 and up 
to 148 countries. Depending on data availability on the explanatory variables not all 
possible country dyads are included over the entire period. 
 
6.  Testing the Clash of Civilizations Against the Strategic Logic of 
International Terrorism 
We conduct three types of analyses. First, we present simple frequency tables of 
international terrorism within and across civilizations. In the second set of analyses we 
report results from multivariate regressions, estimating one parameter for the variables 
of interest to test the static version of our hypotheses. However, since Huntington’s 
paradigm predicts a structural break in the coefficients of the inter-civilizational dummy 
variables, we also, thirdly, re-estimate these models allowing these coefficients to differ 
during and after the Cold War period. 
6.1. The Static Perspective 
Tables 2 and 3 present frequency tables of terrorist incidents and killings within and 
across civilizations. Despite the simplicity of such tables, the reported frequencies 
reveal an interesting pattern. The tables indicate that Westerners are the main target of 
international terrorism in general as well as of Islamic terrorists in particular. They also 
lend some provisional support to the hypothesis that the Islamic civilization is the most 
violent one in terms of international terrorism. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
Yet, frequency tables cannot control for other structural factors that may actually cause 
terrorism. We therefore now turn to multivariate analysis, for which table 4 presents 
negative binomial regression results: 
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Table 4 about here 
 
We briefly discuss the results for the control variables before coming to our main 
results. We find that population sizes of both the origin and the target countries increase 
the number of incidents and killings. Significantly more terrorism is targeted against 
nationals of the same country than against those of other countries. Distance between 
terrorist and target country reduces terrorism. Contiguity is a weakly significantly 
positive factor for incidents, but insignificant for the number of people killed. Like 
others before us (e.g., Cornes and Sandler 2006), we find that terrorism increases in the 
wealth of the targeted country relative to the origin country. Moreover, our results show 
that combinations of political regime type do not differ systematically in their 
propensity to terrorism relative to the base category, the democratic origin–autocratic 
target dyad. Autocratic dyads seem to have fewer incidents, but not killings. Altogether, 
regime type does not seem to matter all that much.13  
As concerns our variables of main interest, we find clear support for our strategic 
theory of international terrorism. More terrorist incidents and killings emanate from 
countries, which depend more on foreign economic aid and on arms imports against 
citizens of the foreign country sending aid and arms. More terrorism also is directed 
against foreigners from countries that have entered into a military alliance with the 
terrorists’ home country and that intervene in civil conflicts in the terrorists’ home 
country on the side of the government. 
Turning to the inter-civilizational dummy variables, we find no significant effect 
with respect to terrorism from the Islamic civilization against nationals of all other 
civilizations in general. In other words, the Islamic civilization is not per se sig-
nificantly more drawn to inter-civilizational terrorism if we control for the geographical 
and socio-political determinants of terrorist activity. However, we find significantly 
positive results for terrorism from other civilizations against the West and for Islamic 
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terrorism against the West, as predicted by Huntington. As explained previously, such a 
result is, however, not necessarily inconsistent with our theory. 
6.2. Inter-civilizational Terrorism During and After the End of the Cold War 
Huntington predicts that the end of the Cold War triggers off conflicts between different 
civilizations. If he is right, then one would expect a structural break around the end of 
the Cold War with an increase in anti-Western terrorism from other civilizations, 
terrorism perpetrated by Islamic groups against other civilizations, and, particularly, 
Islamic terrorism against the West. Our theory does not predict any such structural 
breaks for general Islamic or general anti-Western terrorist activities. For Islamic 
terrorism against the West, the strategic logic of international terrorism suggests that 
this type of terrorism is spurred by active Western military involvement for the 
stabilization of embattled regimes in the Muslim world. 
Previous studies of Huntington’s paradigm have typically been hampered by the 
fact that they could not or did not cover the post-Cold War period (Russett, Oneal and 
Cox 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Henderson 2004). This has allowed Huntington 
(2000: 609) to simply dismiss such studies as ‘temporally irrelevant’. Where studies 
have covered the post-Cold War period, they have typically tested Huntington’s 
predictions for variation over time by a Chow test (Chiozza 2002; Bolks and Stoll 2003; 
Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006). We interact the inter-civilizational dummy variable of 
interest with a Cold War and a post-Cold War dummy variable. Both of these interacted 
terms enter the estimations and the Chow test functions via testing the hypothesis that 
the coefficients of the two interacted terms are equal to each other.14
In table 5 we report Chow-test results. Note that all the other explanatory variables 
were of course included in the estimations, but because their coefficients are practically 
identical to the ones shown in table 4 and to save space, we only report coefficients of 
the interaction terms between the relevant inter-civilizational dummy variables on the 
one hand and dummy variables for the Cold War and post-Cold War period on the other 
hand together with tests of coefficient equality.15
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Table 5 about here 
 
Starting with the clash between Islam and the remaining civilizations, the islam v rest 
dummy variables are statistically insignificant both in the Cold War and in the post-
Cold War period for terrorist incidents, whereas for terrorist killings the variable is 
negative and significant in the Cold War period and insignificant in the post-Cold War 
period. The Wald tests fail to reject the hypotheses of equal coefficients for terrorist 
incidents, but not for terrorist killings. However, this is no evidence for Huntington 
because Islamic terrorists turn from generating below average inter-civilizational 
terrorism to merely average. 
Both of the islam v west dummy variables are statistically significant with the 
expected positive sign for terrorist incidents. However, the Wald test fails to reject the 
hypothesis of equal coefficients and, moreover, the dummy has a smaller coefficient 
during the post-Cold War period than before. As regards terrorist killings, the dyad 
between Islam and the West turns from one that generates significantly below average 
killings during the Cold War period to one with significantly above average killings.16 
Not surprisingly, the test of equality of coefficients suggests much higher terrorist 
activity in the post-Cold War period. The result for islam v west on terrorist killings, but 
not on incidents, can thus be interpreted as evidence for Huntington. 
Finally, while the rest v west dummy variables are statistically significantly positive 
in both periods for both incidents and killings, the Wald tests fail to reject the 
hypotheses of equal coefficients. For incidents, for which the test is close to statistical 
significance, the rest v west dummy variable is, contrary to predictions based on 
Huntington, higher rather than lower in the Cold War period. In sum, there is no 
evidence for Huntington’s dynamic predictions with the exception of the clash between 
Islam and the West and even then only for terrorist killings as the dependent variable.  
We now take a more detailed look at this particular case. To do so we have re-
estimated model 6 of table 4 in “four-year moving average sub-period” models: we 
begin with a sample that covers only the years from 1969 to 1971, then include only the 
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years from 1970 to 1973, and so on and finally estimate the years from 2002 to 2005. 
This gives 34 coefficients for each included variable. These coefficients describe the 
influence of a regressor on the dependent variable over time. The change in a parameter 
from one estimate to the next estimate captures the parameter difference between the 
first year from the first estimate and the last year from the next estimate.  
In order to explore the dynamics of Islam versus West terrorism, we regress the 
estimated islam v west coefficients from the moving average sub-period models on their 
lagged values, a general time trend and a post-Cold War dummy variable. To these we 
add, in separate estimations, two operationalizations of the time period of the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars: The first operationalization is a simple dummy variable 
coded 1 for the years 2002 onwards, and the second ‘counts’ the wars so that it is coded 
1 in 2002 and 2 from 2003 onwards. Table 6 reports the results. The post-Cold War 
dummy is insignificant throughout. This would suggest that the end of the Cold War as 
such does not matter to Islamic terrorism targeted against the West. The invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent stabilization of pro-Western regimes seem to 
spur Islamic anti-Western terrorism, however, as both the dummy war variable (column 
2) and the categorical war variable are statistically significantly positive (column 3). 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
These dynamics of terrorism in the Islam-West dyad do not necessarily falsify 
Huntington’s paradigm. After all, one can regard the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as 
conventional military Huntington-type clashes between the West and Islam, to which 
the Islamic civilization responds with increasingly lethal terrorism (but not more 
terrorist incidents). However, the evidence fits better our strategic logic of international 
terrorism, which stresses the role that active Western military involvement in the 
Islamic civilization for the stabilization of embattled governments plays in promoting 
Islamic terrorism against Western targets. 
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7. Conclusion 
The results reported in this article provide supportive evidence for our strategic theory 
of international terrorism: if foreign countries support the government of the terrorists’ 
home country with economic aid, arms transfers, military alliances and intervention in 
civil wars, then domestic terror leaders have a strategic incentive to attack nationals 
from that foreign country. This is exactly what we find in our estimations of 
international terrorism in a directed country dyad sample over the period 1969 to 2005. 
These patterns of international terrorism are predicted by our strategic theory and are 
simply incompatible with a non-strategic account of international terrorism such as 
Huntington’s paradigm of a clash of civilizations. 
Our results also provide limited supportive evidence for some of the claims con-
tained in Huntington’s paradigm, however. In line with Huntington, we conclude that 
there is excessive terrorism from non-Western and from Islamic countries on Western 
targets. This result is not necessarily inconsistent with our theory since terror leaders 
derive strategic benefits from attacking Western targets, for which our variables of 
strategic interest cannot fully account. More importantly, our analysis does not fully 
support Huntington’s predictions. The Islam versus Rest dummy variable is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. The characterization of Islam drawn in 
Huntington’s work is thus exaggerated, at least with respect to international terrorism. 
The dynamic perspective is also significantly at odds with Huntington. Most im-
portantly, we do not find evidence for a simple structural break in the post-Cold War 
period. Terrorism originating from non-Western civilizations against Western targets 
and inter-civilizational terrorism originating from the Islamic civilization do not 
systematically increase after the end of the Cold War. The dynamics of Islamic 
terrorism against the West reveal an upward trend in the 1990s, but only for terrorist 
killings, not for incidents. Furthermore, this trend is also consistent with a strategic 
logic of international terrorism, which would suggest that Islamic terror on Western 
targets goes up when the West becomes more actively militarily involved in the Islamic 
civilization as part of the US-led “war on terror”. 
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What does our analysis tell us about the likely future of international terrorism? If 
Huntington is right, then we will see more of anti-Western inter-civilizational terrorism, 
more of Islamic terrorism against other civilizations and, particularly, a further rise in 
Islamic terrorism against Western targets. The implications from our own theory of 
terrorism do not suggest any such upward trend. With respect to Islamic terror on 
Western targets, Western countries are in a no-win situation. If they retreat from the 
Muslim world, this will be celebrated as a victory by the terror leaders and a toppling of 
pro-Western regimes dependent on Western support might follow. However, with con-
tinuing Western military intervention in the Muslim world, Islamic terror leaders will 
maintain and possibly increase their attacks on Western targets. Unless the “war on 
terror” leads to the military defeat and destruction of terror groups, which seems 
unlikely based on what we have seen since 9/11, then it is likely to increase, rather than 
decrease, Islamic terrorism against the West. Not only does the “war on terror” raise the 
strategic benefits of perpetrating terrorist acts on Western targets, but, in addition, every 
Muslim hurt or killed in this war may facilitate the recruitment of new followers by 





1  See Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2001; Chiozza 2002; Bolks and 
Stoll 2003; Henderson 2004, 2005; Ellingsen, 2005; Fox 2005; Gartzke and Gleditsch 
2006. 
2  No other single statement in his 1993 article attracted more criticism than this one 
(Huntington 1996: 258). 
3  We call them terror entrepreneurs and terror agents in Neumayer and Plümper (2007) and 
Plümper and Neumayer (2007). 
4  This is not to say that all members of one terrorist organization have identical 
preferences. Rather, terror groups typically consist of “heterogeneous cells, factions, and 
individuals” (Bueno de Mesquita 2005b: 146).  
5  Kydd and Walter (2006: 52) mention five goals: regime change, territorial change, policy 
change, social control, and status quo maintenance. We summarize these goals under the 
term political change. 
6  Four if one includes the anarchist wave dominating the period before the First World 
War. 
7  This is consistent with Torres et al.’s (2006) analysis of the propaganda from extremist 
Islamic movements. They find that almost all of it is in Arabic and addressed at Muslims. 
8  The military strength of the West also implies a power asymmetry that renders terror 
tactically opportune. This becomes nowhere clearer than in Al Qaeda’s 1996 “Declaration 
of War on America”: “[I]t must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power 
between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be 
adopted. (…) And as you know, it is wise, in the present circumstances, for the armed 
military forces not to be engaged in a conventional fighting with the forces of the 
crusader enemy.” (Al Qaeda 2006: 283). 
9  The 2004 Strategic Survey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies came to the 
sobering conclusion that the American presence in Iraq “provided a potent global 
recruitment pretext for al-Qaeda, had galvanized the transnational Islamic terrorist 
movement and probably increased terrorist activity worldwide” (IISS 2004: 169). 
Similarly, Pape (2005: 103) finds that ‘the presence of American military forces for 
combat operations on the homeland territory of the suicide terrorists is stronger than 
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Islamic fundamentalism in predicting whether individuals from that country will become 
al-Qaeda suicide terrorists’. 
10  About 3 and 22 per cent of terror attacks involve terrorists and victims with more than 
one nationality, respectively. 
11  We extend the 2003 value of this variable to the year 2004. Military alliances are very 
persistent over time, which should minimize any bias this may introduce into the 
estimations. The results are fully robust to constraining the estimations to the period 1969 
to 2004. 
12  It seems impossible to us to find valid instruments, which means that we cannot use this 
theoretically superior alternative. 
13  This result seems to be at odds with the findings of Li (2005), who reports that more 
terrorist attacks occur in countries with lower levels of political participation. One has to 
keep in mind, however, that his and our results are hardly comparable since we are 
analyzing directed dyads and Li a monadic dataset. 
14  A Chow-test can be problematic because it can find spurious evidence for a structural 
break if there is a general upward-sloping trend in the dependent variable. Alternative 
tests are available from the authors on request. 
15  We let the post-Cold War period start in 1990, but results are very similar for letting it 
start in 1989 or 1991 instead. 
16  Note that this is true despite the fact that the full death toll of 9/11 is not included in the 
dependent variable, as pointed out in section 5.1. 
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Appendix. Inter-civilizational and Control Variable Definition and Data Sources. 
* rest v west, islam v rest and islam v west: Dummy variables indicating civilizational 
identity of origin and target country. Data from Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000). ‘West’ 
includes all of Western Europe, plus Australia, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Dominica, Grenada, Hungary, Jamaica, Malta, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, Trinidad, US, Vanuatu, 
and Western Samoa. ‘Islam’ includes Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, and Yemen People’s Democratic 
Republic. ‘Rest’ includes all non-Western countries for the rest v west dummy variable 
and all non-Islamic countries for the islam v rest dummy variable. 
* ln pop(origin) and ln pop(target): The natural log of population size of origin and 
target country. Source: World Bank (2006). 
* GDPpc target share: The per capita GDP of the target country divided by the sum of 
per capita GDPs of target and origin country. Source: World Bank (2006). 
* dem-dem, autoc-autoc and autoc-dem: Dummy variables indicating whether origin 
and target countries are pairs of democracies, autocracies or an autocracy-democracy 
combination. The omitted category is that of a democratic origin and autocratic target 
country. To be counted a democracy, the Polity value must be 6 or above. Source: 
Polity IV project at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/polreg.htm. 
* identical dyad: A dummy variable that is set to 1 if the origin and target country are 
identical. 
* ln distance: The natural log of the distance between the capital cities of origin and 
target country. Source: http://www.eugenesoftware.org/. 
* contiguity: This dummy is set to 1 if the two countries are contiguous by land or 
separated by less than 150 miles of sea water. Source: http://www.eugenesoftware.org/. 
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Table 1: Reproduction of Huntington’s Prediction of Conflict Intensity  
(based on Huntington 1996: 245) 
 
 West Islam Japan Latin Ortho. Sinic Hindu African 
West –        
Islam 3 –       
Japan 2 ? –      
Latin 1 ? ? –     
Orthodox 2 3 3 ? –    
Sinic 3 1 1 ? 2 –   
Hindu 2 3 ? ? 1 3 –  
African 1 3 ? ? ? ? ? – 
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Table 2: Sum of Terrorist Incidents in Directed Dyads of Civilizations 
 
Target:
African Hindu Islamic Japanese Latin Orthodox Other Sinic Western Sum Row %
Terror origin:
African 146 12 24 12 5 17 0 1 289 506 7.2
Hindu 0 40 5 2 0 4 1 0 28 80 1.1
Islamic 15 19 893 13 15 115 5 11 1239 2325 33.0
Japanese 1 1 8 31 15 4 0 10 209 279 4.0
Latin 3 3 4 32 517 23 0 7 973 1562 22.2
Orthodox 0 0 22 0 2 114 0 2 202 342 4.9
Other 0 13 8 3 2 15 27 22 45 135 1.9
Sinic 1 1 0 4 0 1 0 24 66 97 1.4
Western 28 7 82 22 32 69 1 12 1497 1750 24.9
Sum 194 96 1046 119 588 362 34 89 4548 7042
Column % 2.8 1.4 14.9 1.7 8.3 5.1 0.5 1.3 64.6  
 
Note: “Other” is the category for two “lone states” (Haiti and Ethiopia) and those small countries not 
classified in Russet, Oneal and Cox (2000). 
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Table 3: Sum of Terrorist Killings in Directed Dyads of Civilizations. 
 
Target:
African Hindu Islamic Japanese Latin Orthodox Other Sinic Western Sum Row %
Terror origin:
African 546 30 29 13 276 53 0 0 357 1304 14.0
Hindu 0 26 0 2 0 0 25 0 362 415 4.5
Islamic 31 68 1396 71 102 126 3 1 2509 4307 46.3
Japanese 0 1 104 15 3 0 0 2 184 309 3.3
Latin 0 3 3 25 662 6 0 0 335 1034 11.1
Orthodox 0 0 22 0 1 312 0 6 28 369 4.0
Other 0 16 6 21 0 54 130 145 188 560 6.0
Sinic 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 265 2 269 2.9
Western 2 2 34 4 6 2 0 2 683 735 7.9
Sum 579 146 1594 151 1050 555 158 421 4648 9302
Column % 6.2 1.6 17.1 1.6 11.3 6.0 1.7 4.5 50.0  
 
Note: “Other” is the category for two “lone states” (Haiti and Ethiopia) and those small countries not 
classified in Russet, Oneal and Cox (2000). 
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Table 4: Negative Binomial Estimation Results 
 
 incidents   killings   
 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 
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islam v rest 0.4406 
(0.3766) 
  -0.0062 
(0.3552) 
  
islam v west   1.1036 
(0.2520) *** 
  0.4974 
(0.2386) * 
 





























N obs 575,876 575,876 575,876 575,876 575,876 575,876 
- log pseudo-likelihood 14253.43 14174.25 14055.09 6718.39 6715.66 6677.56 
pseudo-R² 0.239 0.243 0.250 0.114 0.115 0.120 
* p(z)<0.1   ** p(z)<0.01   *** p(z)<0.001 
Standard errors clustered on civilizational pairs in brackets. 
 
41 
Table 5: Tests for Structural Break in Inter-civilizational Dummy Variable Coefficients 
 
 incidents   killings   
 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 
islam v rest  
    • Cold War 
0.444 
(0.407) 
  -1.038 
(0.583)* 
  
islam v rest 
    • Post-Cold War 
0.438 
(0.360) 
  0.373 
(0.352) 
  
islam v west 
    • Cold War 
 1.117 
(0.246)*** 
  -0.875 
(0.237)*** 
 
islam v west 
    • Post-Cold War 
 1.093 
(0.257)*** 
  0.969 
(0.250)*** 
 
rest v west 
    • Cold War 





rest v west 
    • Post-Cold War 





Chi-square test of 
coefficient equality 
0.00 0.79 2.49 8.01*** 72.83*** 0.02 
  
Standard errors clustered on civilizational pairs in brackets. 
* p(z)<0.1   ** p(z)<0.01   *** p(z)<0.001; • ≡interacted with 
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lagged value of 0.6391 0.4883 0.5539
   coefficient (ldv) (0.1515) *** (0.1428) *** (0.1347) ***
linear trend 0.0360 -0.0074 -0.0075
(0.2600) (0.0271) (0.0264)
post-Cold War dummy 0.1156 0.6955 0.6013
(0.5311) (0.5068) (0.4870)
Afghanistan and 1.3520
   Iraq war dummy (0.4230) **
Afghanistan and 0.7450
   Iraq war categorial (0.2462) **
intercept -0.5866 -0.2243 -0.1929
(0.3199) * (0.3070) (0.3047)
N obs 33 33 33
F 19.01 *** 20.56 *** 21.34 ***
adj. R² 0.711 0.710 0.718  
 
* p(z)<0.1   ** p(z)<0.01   *** p(z)<0.001 
